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Seminar on the Claudestine Services - -

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(NOTE: answers as reported below are keyed numerically to the attached list of questions.)

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answer to all questions pertaining to promotions and personnel policies/practices, in general:

It is necessary for the Agency, like any other organization, to establish a practical wage scale; the allocation of wage slots must be made at all levels. This is not only in keeping with budgetary requirements, but is necessary to administrate our own salary policy.

We have had a liberal policy with respect to promotions in the past and it has simply caught up with us. Promotions will be slower and fewer each year and no relief for this development is foreseen. People will continue to be promoted at all levels, but the procedure is not now so simple. Promotions will be on a competitive basis and that is as it should be.

Our system of promoting personnel is not perfect. It may not always function with complete fairness. Human factors are always present and will always have their obvious effect on any system where individual judgement or evaluation is concerned.

Selection-out System: (5)

There is such a system and it is working. It is hard to determine what is deadwood. How many of you consider yourself deadwood? The process of selecting-out personnel is a lengthy process that involves many steps such as appeal by the employee.

There is always considerable discussion in the Agency with respect to "lead-wood." It usually seems to come from some young man who wonders when the more senior personnel are going to get out so the former can get the job or from personnel who feel that there are not enough personnel in their area of interest, and too many people engaged in something else.

Case Officer Careers: (7)

It is possible to go anywhere as a case officer. There are several supergrades who continue to function as case officers. It is as easy to be promoted in a case officer capacity as any other. However, we do need supervisors and it is preferable to get them from within our own organization. You can so on up the line without taking on supervisory responsibility, but you must be a first-class case officer.

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Heavy Workloads: (8)

It is true that many officers work 50-60 hours a week. Before World War II many people worked that long, but since then it is not so fashionable. With respect to vacations, I notice that there are many long leaves upon return to the United States. This should provide enough time to get your batteries recharged.

Regarding the workload, I don't think that this situation is much worse.

I would certainly not want to see a situation which damaged career personnel. If there is such a situation I would think that the individual could sit down with someone and work out the problem. Often the same workload does not carry over from one assignment to another. There is no need for an individual to feel "put upon." Our Director, 67 years of age, puts in an exhausting work week, including Sunday mornings.

Recalling Overseas Dependents: (14)

I don't know the answer. Defense and State have not solved their approach as yet. I believe we will have to wait and see what develops, then decide what we can and should do. The Director feels that intelligence personnel should be exempt. The situation is very unsettled; the Armed Services are fighting hard against it, and the new administration may support this directive or may change it.

Future Travel of Dependents: (15)

We are going ahead and sending dependents to the field, at least up until the first of the year.

Developing Non-official Cover: (17)

It is hard. The classical concept of long-term, deep cover assets is recommended not only because we like to be able to speak in terms of plans or accomplishment, but because through the lore of espionage, this means is considered most desirable. In practice, this kind of cover is difficult to work out because of the vagaries of human life. This kind of cover will not solve all our problems, but we are doing it and will do more of it. You must ask yourself what you want to accomplish by this cover arrangement. It is not just a question of placement, but how will this pay its way?

Practically speaking, a division chief is not enthused about long-term, deep cover plans because their ultimate production is less clear and they are hard to administer—takes a lot of time. There is no formula for such cover plans; targets differ and countries differ.

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Eventually Stop Using Official Cover: (18)

No.

Modifying Cover Arrangements After Moving: (21)

I suggest that you handle your cover problems personally. That is the best way in the Washington area. If you have doubts discuss the problem with your boss. Don't look to the Agency to solve your cover problems. Look to yourself! Take the initiative--people will help and advise you.

OA Process: (25)

We must go through this process. I don't believe putting more people on the job of handling OA requests would help. Improvement of files and machine records may help, but we have to live with this problem until we find something better. I understand that, if necessary, an OA can be secured in 2h hours and heard no arguments to the contrary.

NIS Section 56: (27)

We are trying to follow up with other intelligence agencies in our intelligence community to see that they do comply with the regulations. This joint effort is improving. The agencies do want to work together in this field. They realize that CI is one area where we must hang together and there is little rivalry. I am not worried about this. We must, of course, get certain procedures worked out more effectively.

Changes by new Administration: (29)

None. I don't know if Sepator Kennedy will make more or less use of intelligence. He has had little experience or contact with intelligence matters as a member of the legislature. If I were to make a reasonable guess I would say that Senator Kennedy has a lot to learn in this area.

SR as Division or Staff: (30)

This is a good debate topic since there are valid arguments on both sides. There are two reasons why SR is a division: (1) In our dealings with those elements of the Government that are concerned with our effort, it behooves us to show a major effort, organizationally directed against the Soviet Union and its handmaiden, International Communism. This cannot be done when SR is buried in some geographic division. (2) The Agency exists because of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. We would be markedly reduced in size or cease to exist at all if it were not for this reason. We should not lose sight of this fact.

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DD/P African Policy: (31)

Our policy with respect to Africa is basically; get stations staffed, find out what's going on, and do something about it.

S & T Collection: (33)

We cannot only concentrate on scientific and technical intelligence--it is all intelligence. The current emphasis is due to the guided missile age. We

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Generation of anything else, but we may have fewer "black" operations, mainly because we have been having less success with them. Basically, if there is a way to do it, do it--use all avenues.

Consolidation of Pentagon Clendestine Operations: (35)

I don't know, I doubt it. There is evidence of more collaboration between the intelligence organizations of the Armed Services, but I doubt very much if they will consolidate their efforts.

Relations with Military Services: (36)

Give them the kind of intelligence they want. Our relations with our customers is as good as the product we offer them. The success of our relations in in proportion to how useful they think we are.

Penetration of DD/P: (39)

I can't answer this. It is exasperating to never know if you have "been had." Continued good security practices are only insurance for us.

Security Violations by COS: (40)

If such a situation worried me I would talk to the COS about it. If he said it was none of my business I would reply that security is the business of all of us. If this move was not successful, I would contact someone passing through or report the facts when I got back to Headquarters. It is our duty to jack one another up. It is not our tradition to be tattle-tales, but if this has been discussed with the person involved there is no stipma of tattling.

Figh Yield Operations: (34)

Will not comment. It is not good practice for us to be discussing our special techniques.

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

- Q: What is the reason for the ban on use of journalists.
- A: This ban on the use of journalists in our business is due to pressure that various press organizations such as the NANP put on the Director. They stated in effect that they did not want the press tied into espionage and implied that they would make it hot for us if we made such an attempt.
 - I believe that this can be worked out so that we can use such persons at least in some cases, if not all. We cannot afford to get the press against us—we must work out sort of an uneasy balance. I would like to get away from this particular regulation, but I am not sure that all case officers would understand the problem. The journalists are reluctant to bear any lable of espionage.
- Q: Is there any legislation contemplated this year which will affect the Agency?
- A: I do not know of any. It appears that there are somethings which the Pirector may dowithin the authority granted him and therefore, in some cases, it may not be necessary for us to go to Congress. Our contacts with Congress regarding new legislation can be ham-stringing. Congress keeps picking at us and if they give us something they seem to expect something in return. We have been advised that, in some cases, we should not attempt to but legislation before Congress because of this quid-pro-quo process.